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**THE CAUCASUS POLICY OF THE RUSSIAN AND OTTOMAN EMPIRES
IN THE FIRST HALF OF THE 18TH CENTURY IN TURKISH HISTORIOGRAPHY
(Based On The Books “History Of Turkey 3. The Ottoman Empire”
And Ahmet Shimshirgil's Kayi-VII Ottoman History.
Against The Holy League)**

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The presented article analyzes the research on the history of the Azerbaijani Safavid State within Turkish historiography and the specific characteristics of its approaches. The majority of Turkish historians tend to place the entire responsibility for the tensions and wars in Safavid-Ottoman relations on the Safavid shahs. Although such researchers attempt to approach the problem seriously, they often content themselves with a simple summary of events rather than a comprehensive scientific analysis.

Some Turkish historians do not sufficiently benefit from the works of Azerbaijani scholars, often dissolving or distorting Azerbaijani history within the history of Iran and the Near East. The presentation of the Safavid State as an "Iranian state" as a rule by these historians leads to the denial of the statehood traditions of the Azerbaijani Turks. Although interest has increased since Azerbaijan gained independence, this traditional subjective bias has not yet been fully eliminated.

Despite these shortcomings, certain attempts have been made to study 18th-century Azerbaijani history, particularly its relations with the Ottoman Empire, thanks to the rich primary sources in Turkish archives. However, the 150-year conflict has often been oversimplified and presented merely as a "Sunni-Shia" struggle.

The article explores this issue by referencing the works of researchers who hold a special place in Turkish historiography, such as Metin Kunt, Sina Akşin, and Ahmet Shimshirgil. By citing excerpts from these researchers' works, the article attempts to prove that the struggle between the Safavid and Ottoman states was far from sectarian, and was, in fact, pursued for political and economic consolidation in the Caucasus and the Middle East.

Keywords: Historiography, Turkey, Safavid State, Russia, Ottoman State.

Introduction. To investigate 18th-century Azerbaijani history more comprehensively and deeply, it is appropriate to refer to the works of Turkish historians. Although Turkish historians address Russia-Ottoman relations over the Caucasus in their research, the Azerbaijani direction of both states' Caucasus policies has not been thoroughly and extensively developed in Turkish historiography. To partially examine the degree to which this topic has been studied in Turkish historiography, I have referred to two monographs and one article.

Main body. One of the books included in this study is the co-authored monograph titled “*Türkiye tarihi 3. Osmanlı Devleti*” (History of Turkey 3. The Ottoman Empire), which reflects certain aspects of the topic. This work investigates the internal and external political processes taking place within the Ottoman Empire throughout the period of Turkish history from the 16th century up until 1908. Special attention is dedicated to Ottoman-Russian relations within the monograph.

As is well known, the foundation of these conflicting relations was laid by the clash of Russian and Ottoman interests in the Caucasus and Europe. With the overthrow of Mustafa II, Ahmed III ascended the throne, during whose reign wars with Russia became inevitable. In this extensive work, greater emphasis is placed on Ottoman internal policy. One of the main points that catches our atten-

tion within the context of Ottoman-Safavid relations is that the work employs not only the term Iran, but also the expression "Safavid State".

The monograph discusses the Afghan invasion, the steps taken by Shah Tahmasp II, and the severe consequences that paved the way for the partition of the territories of the Azerbaijani Safavid State. At the same time, it addresses how Mir Mahmud, from the Ghilzai Afghan tribe, captured a part of the Safavid State, how Tahmasp II consolidated his power in Mazandaran and Astarabad, and how the country's dire situation prompted both Russia and the Ottoman Empire to take action to occupy these territories.

The policy of the Russian Tsar Peter I, aimed at conquering the South Caucasus and Iran, thereby threatening the eastern flank of the Ottoman Empire also incited the Ottomans to seize this region [1, s.205].

The sudden and rapid attack of the Afghans had put Shah Tahmasp II in a desperate situation; he even agreed to cede the Caspian Sea coastal territories demanded by Russia to the Tsar, something he had previously found unacceptable. In return for this treaty, Russia was supposed to assist the Safavids in the struggle against the Afghans and expel them from the occupied territories. This agreement was paving the way for a clash between Russia and the Ottoman Empire. However, the Ottoman Empire was of the opinion that this treaty would have no force: "Initially, the Ottoman Empire put forward the view that while Shah Husayn was alive, Tahmasp would not be shah, and therefore, Tahmasp's treaty with Russia was insignificant. Later, however, the Ottoman Empire was forced to accept the Russian advance" [6, s.60].

Thus, on the instructions of Peter I, who attached great importance to the capture of Baku, located on the shores of the Caspian Sea and being the home of oil, Matyushkin captured the city on 26 July 1723 after bombarding it: "He is the first Russian ruler to show an interest in Baku oil. Intending to conduct extensive experiments to analyse the composition of the oil, Peter wrote to Matyushkin: 'Send a thousand poods or as much white oil as possible to find a master here'" [7, s.39]. "Baku oil, which was used as an illuminating fuel in Russia and Turkey, also attracted their attention as a valuable military-strategic material. This was because, at that time, oil was a highly favorable means of setting enemy ships on fire during naval battles" [9, s.10-11]. As can be seen, mutual interests created the conditions for reaching an agreement on the partition of the Safavid State.

Although the Ottoman Empire and Russia reached an agreement on the partition of the Safavid State, they remained cautious of each other. The monograph notes: "... Having intruded into the South Caucasus region, Russia and the Ottoman Empire, on the one hand, found an opportunity to exploit the internal turmoil within Iran; on the other hand, they were forced to act vigilantly to limit each other's gains. At a time when Iran's internal integrity was dissolving, a reason arose for Ottoman soldiers to enter the Safavid country, as Shirvan in the South Caucasus region sought protection from the Ottomans. However, the three-pronged offensive by the Ottoman armies invading Iran in 1723, meaning that while they marched towards Shirvan on the Caucasus front, they simultaneously launched campaigns against Tabriz and Hamadan, demonstrates that the Shirvan campaign was a pretext to seize as much territory as possible from the Safavids" [6, s.60].

"The Russian and Ottoman Empires signed and ratified an agreement stating that, through joint efforts and without ruling out the use of military force, they would 'persuade' Generalissimo Tahmasp II to 'cede' the South Caucasian Persian lands in exchange for a promise to fight against Mir Mahmud, who had occupied Isfahan and captured Husayn I" [8, s.31].

As we know, the local population, led by Nader Khan, resisted the Ottomans in the captured territories. This situation was advantageous for Russia. The strong and long-term nature of this resistance placed the Ottoman Empire in an unexpected predicament. Consequently, Ahmed III wished to sign a peace treaty with Tahmasp II by returning a large portion of the seized lands. However, Nader Khan, who commanded the army, did not agree to these terms and launched a military campaign in 1730 with the aim of reclaiming the occupied territories. "...Unlike the earlier stages, the war waged by Nader Shah took place mostly within Ottoman territory. For exactly 14 years, Nader Shah's forces repeatedly launched attacks on Baghdad, Mosul, Kirkuk, Shamakhi, and Kars... Finally, in 1746, the

parties agreed to establish the boundaries of the 17th century. The war continued intermittently for 24 years, starting from 1722” [6, s.61]. Russia attempted to exploit Nader's adversarial relations with the Ottoman Empire.

Finally, Nadir Khan, who successfully concluded the war against the Ottoman army in 1730–1735, brought the South Caucasus back under his control [10, s.30].

In the monograph under discussion and in the works of several other authors, it is argued that the Ottoman Empire did not demonstrate a correct stance during this period. They emphasise that it failed to wage war against Russia, did not save the Caucasus, including Azerbaijan, from Russian aggression, and confined its actions merely to territorial gains. However, the authors do not provide detailed commentary on this matter, limiting themselves to just one or a few sentences. The idea that the Ottoman Empire made serious mistakes regarding the Caucasus and that “Istanbul could have utilized the forces in the Caucasus and Iran to unite them against a common enemy” also draws attention. Yet, the reasons behind the Ottoman Empire displaying such a stance are sometimes overlooked. The Ottoman Empire was losing its former power, and European states along with Russia were actively working towards the weakening of Istanbul.

It should be noted that the issue was also distorted by imperial and Soviet historians. They justified Russia's campaigns to the South Caucasus. Defending this position, a prominent Russian historian writes that “Peter I's Persian campaign was of great significance for the South Caucasus peoples' struggle for liberation against Iranian and Turkish oppression” [5, s.86-87].

The next work included in our study is Ahmet Shimshirgil's book titled “Kayı-VII Osmanlı tarihi. Kutsal ittifaka karşı” (Kayı-VII Ottoman History. Against the Holy League). It should be noted that the author has produced nine books under the “Kayı” title. In this work, the author addresses the internal and external policies of the Ottoman Empire, starting from the reign of Mahmud II up to Murad V. As is the case in other works by Turkish historians, significant space is dedicated here to the Pruth River Campaign, one of the main events of 18th-century Ottoman history, along with its causes and consequences. The primary aspect that catches our attention in the book is the level of investigation into Safavid - Ottoman relations.

In Ahmet Shimshirgil's other work, “Kayı-VII kutsal ittifaka karşı”, matters such as the reign of Shah Husayn, the collapse of the Safavids as a result of his incompetence, Mahmud Khan's invasion and capture of a large part of the country, including Isfahan, and other issues are noted.

The author provides a detailed account of the processes taking place within the Safavid State during the reign of Shah Tahmasp, including Tahmasp's escape during the Afghan attack and his self-proclamation as shah. An interesting point is that Shah Tahmasp II “...notified Ibrahim Pasha, the Governor and Serasker of Erzurum, through the Governor of Van, of his intention to send an envoy to Istanbul to inform the Ottoman Padishah of his accession to the throne. However, since the Ottoman government did not yet have accurate information regarding the situation and death of Shah Husayn, the Governor of Erzurum was ordered to detain the envoy to be sent by Tahmasp in Erzurum until this matter was clarified, with his expenses to be covered by the treasury” [12, s.197].

The work presents the following views regarding a provocative letter by the Governor of Baghdad, who, recalling an old animosity at a time when the Russians had begun their occupation during the Safavids' dire period, influenced the escalation of Ottoman-Safavid relations: “During the course of events, the Governor of Baghdad sent [a letter] to the Sultan: ‘Meanwhile, in a letter dated 1723 sent by the Governor of Baghdad, he wrote that the time had come to take revenge on the Iranians, who caused the deaths of the Sheykhein, namely, Hazrat Abu Bakr, Hazrat Umar, and the third caliph, Hazrat Uthman, and requested permission to march upon Kermanshah. Since this appeal also aligned with the desires of the government, which was looking for an opportunity to attack Iran, it decided on a campaign not to protect the Iranian people from the Afghans, but rather for the purpose of annexing Iranian lands into Ottoman territory’”.

Due to the legality of the upcoming campaign, Sheikh ul-Islam Abdullah Efendi issued a fatwa (1723). According to this decision, the seraskers were instructed to act in concert on three fronts: the Caucasus, Azerbaijan, and Iraq” [12, s.197].

This quotation cited from Ahmet Shimshirgil does not stand up to logical scrutiny. Firstly, it seems unconvincing that an Ottoman sultan, whose empire spanned three continents, would possess such weak judgment as to launch an invasion based solely on a governor's views regarding the Rashidun Caliphs. Secondly, the facts written by the Governor of Baghdad in the letter are incorrect. This is because among the three named Rashidun Caliphs, only Umar was assassinated by an Iranian slave. It is true that sectarian divisions exerted a certain influence on the foreign policies of both states. However, the assertion that the Ottoman Empire attacked the Safavid State specifically for this purpose does not reflect the historical reality. It is well known from various works that the Ottoman officials, led by the sultan, could not remain on the sidelines upon seeing that the Afghans and the Russians were partitioning the territories of the Safavid State which was predominantly inhabited by Turks, regardless of any sectarian differences.

Thus, taking advantage of the fragmentation of the Safavid State, the rapid military campaigns of the Afghan tribes in 1721, and the Caspian campaign of the Russian Emperor Peter I that took place in 1722-1723, the Ottoman Sultan Ahmed III launched a large-scale offensive to the east in the spring of 1723 [4, s.19].

With the escalation of Ottoman-Safavid relations, the Khan of Yerevan participated in the campaign launched by the Sublime Porte (Bab-ı Ali) on three fronts towards the Safavid State: "The Khan of Yerevan, Mahammad Qulu Khan, who had surrendered to the Ottomans, attacked Tbilisi, besieged King Vakhtang, and captured Tbilisi. Initially, Mustafa Pasha, and subsequently Arif Ahmed Pasha, were appointed to this region. Later on, the Kura River and its surroundings were seized, and their administration was entrusted to Omer Pasha" [12, s.198].

The work discusses the negligence of the Governor of Erzurum, Sipahdar Ibrahim Pasha, regarding the defence of Baku, which consequently resulted in the Russians capturing the city: "On the other hand, due to the sluggish movements and greed of Ibrahim Pasha, the Governor of Erzurum and the serasker of that front, as well as his failure to assist Davud Khan, the Khan of Shirvan, despite governmental instructions, Baku fell into Russian hands. Ibrahim Pasha was dismissed from his post due to these actions and the undermining of the state's authority in the Caucasus, and Arif Ahmed Pasha was appointed in his place" [12, s.198]. Ahmed Pasha actively participated in the Ottoman-Safavid wars of 1723-1727 and 1730-1736, as well as the Ottoman-Afshar war (1743-1746) [4, s.21].

Following his new appointment, Arif Ahmed Pasha launched a campaign in the direction of Yerevan: "On 28 September 1724, Yerevan surrendered upon the appeal of Ali Qulu Khan, the Governor of Yerevan, who had lost hope of receiving assistance from Tahmasp after a fierce three-month siege. Its defence was assigned to Vizier Osman Pasha, the Governor of Anatolia. Shortly before the surrender of Yerevan, Nakhchivan had been acquired" [12, s.198]. According to some sources, the defence of Yerevan lasted for 24 days, and the defenders of the inner fortress managed to hold out even longer. The victors acquired 79 cannons, as well as a sword seven spans long that had hung from the fortress gates since the reign of Shah Abbas. This sword was sent to Sultan Ahmed III [9, s.31].

The capture of Yerevan was considered a major success for the Ottoman Empire. This situation would grant the Ottoman Empire an advantage during the treaty to be signed with Russia: "The capture of Yerevan caused great satisfaction for Ahmed Khan III. In addition to granting the Yerevan province to Serasker Arif Ahmed Pasha alongside Diyarbakir, he sent him a gift of fifteen thousand kurus from the inner treasury, the Ehderun treasury, to meet his other needs. Following this, the Lori and Ganja fortresses were seized (August-September 1725) by Haji Mustafa Pasha, the Governor of Erzurum, who had been appointed as serasker in place of Arif Ahmed Pasha" [12, s.198].

The work notes Russia's skillful exploitation of the turmoil occurring in Shirvan: "During the collapse of the Safavid Shahdom in Iran, apart from the Afghan and Ottoman conquests, the Russians in the north towards Dagestan also wished to claim their share of the spoils. Around this time, the killing of Prince Cherkassky along with some Russian merchants in Shamakhi by Lezgin tribes provided the Russian ruler with the very opportunity he was seeking. Thus, under the pretext of establishing order against the Lezgins, they declared war on Iran and occupied Baku" [12, s.203-204].

Haji Davud Khan, taking advantage of the final situation of the Safavids, launched an attack on Shamakhi alongside Surkhay Khan: "At this time, Davud Khan, who had gone into opposition against the Iranian government and seized Shirvan, appealed to the Ottoman government with a request to protect himself against the Russian advance. Damad Ibrahim Pasha, seeing this appeal as aligned with his own policy, immediately granted Haji Davud Khan the authority of ownership over the Shirvan Khanate and notified the Russian Tsardom that this area was under his protection; consequently, the Russians halted their attacks" [12, s.204].

Haji Davud attempted to realise his dangerous intention of drawing a certain portion of the Shamakhi population to his side by exploiting sectarian divisions: "In addition to this, utilizing 'religious' slogans to win the people over to his side, Haji Davud called upon them to 'unite against the Shia Safavids'" [3, s.37].

It is also written here regarding Tahmasp II sending a delegation to Russia in connection with repelling the Afghan attacks: "By promising to assist Shah Tahmasp, he concluded an agreement, in accordance with which they occupied Gilan (Ceylan), Mazandaran, and Astrabad along the Caspian Sea coast" [12, s.204].

This monograph also reflects the historical processes found in other works. However, this author points out discrimination on religious grounds as one of the primary causes of the uprisings taking place within the territory of the Safavid State: "The Sunni population, who had been subjected to severe Shia pressure for more than a century, recently took up arms by exploiting the situation in Iran and the Afghan movements; under the command of Haji Davud Bey, they defeated the Iranians several times. They attacked Shamakhi, Barda, Ardabil, and the surrounding areas, killing the Shias there. To consolidate their position, a delegation of the ulama and prominent figures of Shirvan was sent to Istanbul to request in a petition that Haji Davud Bey who had been protecting them from Iranian aggression for three years be appointed as their khan under Ottoman protection (September 1722)" [12, s.204]. Nader well understood that sectarian differences caused conflict. For this reason, he repeatedly sent representatives to the Ottoman Empire to secure the acceptance of the Ja'fari school of thought (Ja'farism) to unite Sunnis and Shias, but it was rejected. However, it should be noted that Haji Davud did not march on Shamakhi solely due to sectarian differences.

Discussions were being held within the Ottoman government regarding Dagestan matters. During the debates, based on the premise that these territories belonged to the Ottoman Empire until Iran seized them, it was concluded that a struggle was necessary to restore these lands to their former owners. However, "Grand Vizier Ibrahim Pasha, putting forward the view that an intervention would drag the Ottoman Empire into a war not only with Iran but also with Russia, advised staying away. Nevertheless, since the majority put forward the idea that it was necessary to aid the helpless, particularly those of the Sunni sect, it was communicated to Silahdar Ibrahim Pasha, the Governor of Erzurum, to make a decision on marching into Iran should an attack be launched against the people of Shirvan by Iran" [12, s.204-205]. Conversely, when a somewhat similar proposal was made by the Safavid side, the grand vizier had demonstrated a different attitude: "When the ambassador finally gained an audience to request assistance against the rebels, the vizier did not give a positive response and said that the rebels were also Muslims, they (i.e., the Ottomans) could not act against fellow Muslims, and the Ottoman side would not help either party" [9, s.13].

In the work, special emphasis is placed on the activities of the French ambassador, the Marquis de Bonnac, in resolving the Ottoman-Russian conflict. It was decided to utilize the mediation of the French ambassador to settle the dispute between the Ottoman Empire and Russia: "Although the Russian envoy took the floor first and proposed halting the campaign in Iran, the Ottoman representatives rejected the Russian envoy's proposal, stating that Azerbaijan, Georgia, Shirvan, and Dagestan originally belonged to the Ottomans, later passed to Iran, and today should return to their rightful owner" [12, s.206].

Following this response, the Russian envoy Neplyuyev stated that he would respond to the matter after consultations with Moscow, whereupon the French ambassador, the Marquis de Bonnac, declared that negotiations would resume after three months: "It was agreed to conduct negotiations

again after ninety days and to halt Ottoman-Russian military operations around the Caspian Sea during this period” [12, s.206].

Touching upon the role of the Marquis de Bonnac in the 1724 agreement, the work states: “The French ambassador explained that a conflict between Russia and the Ottoman Empire would be beneficial for Austria. ‘Following this, both sides acted more gently towards each other, and the Ottoman Empire desisted from demanding Derbent and Baku, which were under Russian occupation. Since Russia also accepted this framework, an agreement was reached on 24 June 1724. The treaty was defined across six articles and one outline (demarcation layout)’” [12, s.207].

It should be noted that “the Russian government duly rewarded the French ambassador in Istanbul, de Bonnac, for the valuable information and advice he provided to Neplyuyev, presenting him with a gift of various precious furs valued at 1,000 rubles. Additionally, a decision was made to send gifts worth 3,000 manats [rubles] for the Reis-ül-küttab and other high-ranking Ottoman officials” [9, s.18].

Thus, the weakening of the Safavid State and its failure to pursue a proper foreign policy determined its tragic fate. The fact that Russia began implementing its aggressive plans in the southern direction and the clash of Russian-Ottoman interests occurred at the expense of losing the territories of the Safavid State [11, s.106]. The territories were not merely being lost; their ethnic composition was also being altered: “With the ratification of the treaty on 24 September 1724, Brigadier Rumyantsev, who was sent to Istanbul, was ordered by the Tsar to persuade the Armenians as much as possible to settle in Gilan and other places, replacing the Persians” [2, s.67].

As can be seen in the book, the reign of Ahmed III, and the Russian-Safavid-Ottoman relations during this period, have been investigated within the context of the South Caucasus. However, [the author] has brought to the forefront the idea that the cause of most of these problems lay on religious grounds.

Conclusion. The investigation of Safavid-Ottoman-Russian relations within the context of the presented foundational historical works "Türkiye tarihi 3. Osmanlı devleti 1600-1908" edited by Metin Kunt and Sina Akşin, Ahmet Shimshirgil's "Kayı VII" comprehensively and systematically reveals the complex dynamics of regional geopolitical rivalry. A joint analysis of these fundamental works clearly demonstrates that the large-scale political processes unfolding in the Near East, the Caucasus, the Crimea, and the Caspian regions during the 17th and 18th centuries were not limited solely to the internal rivalry between two great Muslim states; rather, they were further complicated by the Russian Empire's strategy of southward expansion and its drive to access warm seas.

It is evident from the scholarly conclusions of historical research and archival documents that while Safavid-Ottoman relations have traditionally been explained in Turkish historiography through internal ideological contradictions and sectarian factors, the intensive emergence of the Russian factor in the works of Shimshirkil and other contemporary authors has introduced a new, trilateral geopolitical dimension to these relations. The weakening of the Safavid State against the backdrop of internal crises paved the way for Tsarist Russia's active military-political advance toward the Caspian Sea and the South Caucasus under the leadership of Peter I. This dangerous course of events, in turn, compelled the Ottoman Empire to launch military interventions into Safavid territories or to make certain historical compromises with Russia in order to protect its own regional interests and prevent the Russians from fully consolidating their power in the region.

In conclusion, a comprehensive study of the aforementioned historical works proves that Safavid-Ottoman-Russian relations were not merely a series of local and regional military clashes, but rather a historical process of a global nature that fundamentally altered the strategic balance of power across the entire Eurasian space. The decline of the Safavid State and the massive geopolitical vacuum this collapse created in the region formed a long-term arena of rivalry for both the Ottoman Empire and Russia. These presented works provide future researchers with a rich scholarly framework, solid arguments, and a crucial methodological foundation to re-evaluate regional security, historical border conflicts, and the system of diplomatic alliances in a more objective, multifaceted manner and under the light of extensive documentation.

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XVIII ƏSRİN BİRİNCİ YARISINDA RUSİYA VƏ OSMANLI İMPERİYALARININ QAFQAZ SİYASƏTİ TÜRKİYƏ TARİXŞÜNASLIĞINDA ("Türkiye Tarihi 3. Osmanlı Devleti" və Ahmet Şimşirgilin "Kayı-VII Osmanlı Tarihi. Kutsal İttifaka Karşı" kitabları əsasında)

Təqdim olunmuş məqalədə Azərbaycan Səfəvi dövləti tarixinin Türkiyə tarixşünaslığında tədqiqi və yanaşma xüsusiyyətləri təhlil edilir. Türkiyə tarixçilərinin əksəriyyəti Səfəvi-Osmanlı münasibətlərindəki gərginlik və müharibələrin bütün məsuliyyətini Səfəvi şahlarının üzərinə qoymağa çalışırlar. Belə tədqiqatçılar problemə ciddi yanaşmağa cəhd etsələr də, geniş elmi təhlil əvəzinə çox zaman hadisələrin sadə xülasəsi ilə kifayətlənirlər.

Bəzi Türkiyə tarixçiləri Azərbaycan alimlərinin əsərlərindən kifayət qədər faydalanmır, Azərbaycan tarixini İran və Yaxın Şərq tarixi daxilində əridir və ya təhrif edirlər. Belə tarixçilər tərəfindən xüsusilə Səfəvilər dövlətinin bir qayda olaraq "İran dövləti" kimi qələmə verilməsi, Azərbaycan türklərinin dövlətçilik ənənələrinin inkar olunmasına gətirib çıxarır. Azərbaycan müstəqillik qazandıqdan sonra maraq artsa da, bu ənənəvi subyektiv meyil hələ də tam aradan qalxmamışdır.

Çatışmazlıqlara baxmayaraq, Türkiyə arxivlərindəki zəngin ilk mənbələr sayəsində XVIII əsr Azərbaycan tarixi, xüsusilə də Osmanlı ilə münasibətlərin tədqiqinə müəyyən cəhdlər edilmişdir. Lakin yüz əlli illik qarşıdurma çox vaxt bəsitləşdirilərək sadəcə "sünni-şiə" mübarizəsi kimi təqdim olunmuşdur.

Məqalədə problem Türkiyə tarixşünaslığında xüsusi yeri olan Metin Kunt, Sina Akşin, Ahmet Shimshirgil kimi tədqiqatçıların əsərlərinə müraciət edərək qeyd olunan problem araşdırılmışdır. Tədqiqatçıların əsərlərindən iqtibaslar gətirilərək Səfəvilər və Osmanlı dövlətləri arasında gedən mübarizənin məzhəbdən uzaq olduğunu, əslində hər iki dövlətin Qafqaz və Orta Şərqdə siyasi və iqtisadi cəhətdən möhkəmlənmək uğrunda aparıldığı sübut edilməyə çalışılmışdır.

Açar sözlər: Tarixşünaslıq, Türkiyə, Səfəvi dövləti, Rusiya, Osmanlı dövləti.

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**КАВКАЗСКАЯ ПОЛИТИКА РОССИЙСКОЙ И ОСМАНСКОЙ ИМПЕРИЙ
В ПЕРВОЙ ПОЛОВИНЕ XVIII ВЕКА В ТУРЕЦКОЙ ИСТОРИОГРАФИИ
(на основе книг “История Турции 3. Османское государство” и Ахмета Шимширгили
“Кайы-VII Османская история. Против Священной лиги”)**

В представленной статье анализируются исследования по истории азербайджанского государства Сефевидов в турецкой историографии и особенности методологических подходов. Большинство турецких историков стремятся возложить всю ответственность за напряженность и войны в сефевидско-османских отношениях на сефевидских шахов. Хотя подобные исследователи и пытаются серьезно подойти к проблеме, вместо глубокого научного анализа они зачастую ограничиваются простым изложением событий.

Некоторые турецкие историки недостаточно используют труды азербайджанских ученых, растворяя или искажая историю Азербайджана в рамках истории Ирана и Ближнего Востока. Преподнесение государства Сефевидов такими историками, как правило, в качестве «иранского государства» ведет к отрицанию государственных традиций азербайджанских тюрок. Несмотря на рост интереса после обретения Азербайджаном независимости, эта традиционная субъективная тенденция до сих пор полностью не изжита.

Несмотря на существующие недостатки, благодаря богатым первоисточникам в турецких архивах были предприняты определенные попытки исследовать историю Азербайджана XVIII века, особенно его отношения с Османской империей. Однако полуторавековое противостояние зачастую упрощалось и преподносилось лишь как «суннитско-шиитская» борьба.

В статье данная проблема исследуется на основе обращения к трудам таких исследователей, занимающих особое место в турецкой историографии, как Метин Кунт, Сина Акшин и Ахмет Шимширгиль. С привлечением цитат из их работ предпринимается попытка доказать, что борьба между Сефевидским и Османским государствами была далека от конфессионального фактора и фактически велась за политическое и экономическое укрепление обоих государств на Кавказе и Ближнем Востоке.

Ключевые слова: Историография, Турция, Сефевидское государство, Россия, Османское государство.

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